Analysis on Donroe Doctrine

On 3 January 2026, the United States of America conducted a large-scale military operation in Venezuela, forcibly removing President Nicolás Maduro and extraditing him to the United States for criminal prosecution. According to the Security Council briefing, the operation was conducted after several months of escalating US military activity in and around Venezuela. Beginning in September 2025, the United States increased its naval and aerial presence in the southern Caribbean, citing counter-narcotics objectives. During this period, US forces carried out repeated interdictions of vessels in international waters, resulting in reported civilian casualties. On 3 January 2026, the United States launched coordinated air strikes in Caracas to disable Venezuelan air defences, followed by the deployment of special operations forces that seized President Maduro and his spouse. The individuals were transported to New York, where US authorities initiated criminal proceedings. (UNSC Briefing, 5 January 2026). 

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How Donroe doctrine threatens the law 

At the most basic level, the operation constitutes a violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. The use of air strikes, special forces, and coercive removal of a sitting head of state clearly amounts to armed force attributable to the United States. The operation was conducted without Venezuelan consent or any Security Council authorisation, and outside any recognised exception under the UN Charter. Therefore, it represents a prima facie breach of the core prohibition on the use of force. However, International law operates as a coherent system in which certain outcomes are rendered unlawful because they contradict multiple foundational principles simultaneously. As Malcolm Shaw explains, the Charter must be interpreted as a constitutional framework governing inter-state relations rather than as a checklist of isolated rules. Within this framework, the forcible removal of a government by an external state constitutes a violation of the system as a whole, even in the absence of an explicit textual prohibition (Shaw, International Law, 9th ed., pp. 845–848).

At the core of this structural prohibition lies Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Regime change, by definition, targets the political independence of a state, as it seeks to determine or replace its governing authority through external coercion. The illegality of such action does not depend on territorial annexation, the scale of hostilities, or the duration of military presence. Rather, as Shaw emphasises, the purpose and object of the force are decisive. Where force is used to alter the political leadership of another state, it directly contravenes the protected sphere of political independence envisaged by Article 2(4), rendering the use of force unlawful regardless of collateral factors. This conclusion is reinforced by the principle of non-intervention, codified in Article 2(7) of the Charter and elaborated by the International Court of Justice. In the Nicaragua v United States judgement, the Court held that intervention includes “coercive interference in matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely” (ICJ Reports 1986, para. 205). The selection of a state’s government and political leadership lies at the core of domestic jurisdiction. 

Claims concerning the illegitimacy or undemocratic nature of a government do not alter this legal position. International law deliberately separates the doctrines of recognition and the law governing the use of force. Recognition is a discretionary political act, while the use of force is regulated by objective legal rules under the Charter. As Shaw makes it clear, recognition does not confer enforcement authority and does not create legal rights to intervene militarily. States may lawfully withhold recognition, impose sanctions, or engage in diplomatic isolation, but they may not employ force to remove a government on the basis of perceived illegitimacy without Security Council authorisation (Shaw, pp. 852–854). 

Attempts to justify regime change retroactively through recognition of a successor authority are also legally untenable. International law acknowledges an existing factual situation but does not legalise the means by which that situation was created. The ICJ has consistently rejected ex post facto justifications for violations of the Charter, affirming that the legality of the use of force must be assessed at the moment it occurs (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 148). Allowing recognition to validate forcible regime change would invert the rule of law by permitting military success to generate legal authority. 

(AI Generated)

Political justification and the legal context 

The political character of the operation cannot be assessed by isolating individual stages such as arrest, transfer, or prosecution. Under the governing framework provided by the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA, 2001), which codify customary international law when a state engages in a series of connected actions pursuant to a single policy or operation, responsibility attaches to the conduct as a whole rather than to its individual components viewed in isolation. Article 15 of ARSIWA addresses “composite acts”, defined as breaches resulting from a series of actions or omissions which, taken together, constitute an internationally wrongful act. The provision clarifies that responsibility extends over the entire period during which the conduct continues and remains inconsistent with the international obligation breached. The legal significance of Article 15 lies in its rejection of fragmentation: a state may not escape responsibility by arguing that individual steps in a broader operation, when viewed separately, might appear lawful. Where actions are planned, coordinated, and executed as part of a unified course of conduct, international law treats them as a single wrongful act whose legality must be assessed holistically. 

Applied to the operation against Venezuela, the relevant conduct constitutes one integrated operation attributable to the United States. The initial use of armed force on Venezuelan territory engages Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The forcible seizure of the sitting head of state violates the principle of sovereign equality under Article 2(1) of the Charter and breaches the customary rule of personal immunity (immunity ratione personae). The removal of the head of state from Venezuelan territory constitutes an infringement of territorial integrity and parallels conduct examined in cases concerning unlawful renditions. The subsequent transfer to United States jurisdiction and initiation of criminal proceedings represent an exercise of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction without consent, contrary to the principles of non-intervention and immunity. These actions were not independent or accidental but formed a continuous chain directed toward a single outcome, satisfying the definition of a composite act under Article 15 ARSIWA. 

International jurisprudence confirms that such conduct must be assessed as a unified whole. In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, the International Court of Justice held that a series of acts, including the initial seizure and subsequent detention of diplomats, constituted a continuing internationally wrongful act whose illegality persisted over time (ICJ Reports 1980, paras. 56–58). The Court rejected attempts to treat later conduct as legally distinct from the initial breach. This reasoning

applies directly to situations where an unlawful seizure gives rise to ongoing detention and prosecution: subsequent acts do not cleanse the original illegality but rather perpetuate it. 

Attempts to justify later stages of the operation by reference to domestic law are expressly foreclosed by the law of state responsibility. Article 32 of ARSIWA provides that a state may not rely on its internal law as justification for failure to comply with its international obligations.

Accordingly, domestic criminal indictments, statutory jurisdiction, or executive authorisations under national law cannot legalise conduct that is internationally wrongful at its inception. International responsibility is determined solely by reference to international law, not by the internal legal characterisation adopted by the acting state. Comparative practice further reinforces this conclusion. The Eichmann abduction is frequently cited in support of forcible capture followed by prosecution, yet it does not establish a permissive precedent. Israel formally acknowledged that the abduction violated Argentina’s sovereignty, and the matter was resolved diplomatically through acknowledgement and apology. Malcolm Shaw explicitly cautions against treating Eichmann as legal authorisation for extraterritorial abductions, noting that the case confirms responsibility rather than negates it (Shaw, International Law, 9th ed., pp. 876–878).

The legal consequences of a composite internationally wrongful act are governed by Articles 30 and 31 of ARSIWA. The responsible state is under an obligation to cease the wrongful conduct and to make full reparation for the injury caused. Where the wrongful act is continuing, responsibility persists until the breach is brought to an end. In this context, continued detention and prosecution constitute ongoing violations, not discrete or cured acts. Failure to reverse the consequences of the initial unlawful seizure aggravates responsibility rather than diminishing it. Hence, the operation cannot be characterised as a controversial arrest followed by lawful prosecution. It constitutes a single composite internationally wrongful act engaging multiple obligations under the UN Charter and customary international law. Once the initial use of force and seizure was unlawful, the entire chain of conduct that followed remained legally indivisible and continuously wrongful under international law.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

United Nations Resolutions

United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.

International Court of Justice Cases

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986.

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005.

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007.

International Law Commission Materials

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001.

Articles 15, 30, 31, and 32.

Books and Scholarly Works

Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, 9th edn (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

United Nations Documents

United Nations Security Council, Briefing on the Situation in Venezuela, 5 January 2026.

United Nations Charter, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.

Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7).

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ABOUT WRITER

Kartik Nandal is a student of sociology and psychology at University of Delhi, passionate about policy making and mental health advocacy he has been doing MUNs for the past 6 years, bringing diverse mindset to the committee.