The Street as a Diplomatic Stage: Counter-Diplomacy, Performed Sovereignty, and the Politics of Recognition

What would happen if there were no embassies of a particular state? What if there were no diplomatic seal and no diplomats? What might result from this? The number of ways of comprehending how diplomacy operates varies. It used to be connected to embassies, ministries of foreign affairs and negotiations in which diplomats would express their views in diplomatic language (United Nations [UN], 1961). It looks like there is a division of actors. States talk and the matters they address concern some unspoken actors. However, when diplomacy is not possible, it is time for people to create their own stage for the performance of diplomacy. Street theatre is one of these stages where body talks, memory is revealed through testimony and action is the message stating “We are here, we remember and we have something to say” (McConnell, 2018).
Street theatre in occupied and marginalised areas implies the necessity of communication, spatial occupancy, collective memory, testimonial evidence, symbolic representation and global signalling (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2014; Varghese, 2020). Street theatre is an act of counter-diplomacy or international performance of excluded groups. Street theatre is employed as a tool for performing collective identity, challenging territorial discourses, asserting identity, generating recognition and establishing temporary sovereignty without the need of any traditional organisations (Nicholson, 2014; Varghese, 2020). In this sense, street theatre can be regarded as a form of diplomacy, when claims are made and power is exercised (McConnell, 2018). On the basis of the constructivist paradigm, identities and interests develop on the basis of the relationships in which communities seeking sovereignty gain identity through connections with states and foreigners (Wendt, 1992).
The Metis diplomacy as introduced by Gëzim Visoka corresponds to the concept of statehood performance via situated everyday actions rather than thresholds (Visoka, 2019). Performance is defined as an act that is combined with experience and is crucial for performativity because the act’s repetition creates reality (Butler, 1990). Studies of the question of the statehood of Palestine and the self-making of sovereignty have indicated that the diplomatic acts performed repeatedly can lead to the emergence of sovereignty in its full sense (Nicholson, 2014; Varghese, 2020). The diplomacy of uncertainty conducted by Visoka proves that the aspiring states are able to create their own presence despite the ongoing dispute, signifying that public performance can establish the practical legitimacy of a governing authority without achieving formal statehood under international law (Visoka & Brajshori, 2025).
Public spaces, refugee camps, demonstrations all become stages of the theatre of sovereignty, where human bodies become the actors (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2014). Through chanting, banners, interpretations, discussion, silence, and movement, people are able to express their suffering, recount their story of being lost, construct their homeland and transform the language of power (Boal, 1979; Varghese, 2020). It is through such practices that the community emerges as the speaking subject, the repository of history and the actor who is searching for recognition (McConnell, 2018). This is why counter-diplomacy becomes the first step towards paradiplomacy. Paradiplomacy refers to the diplomatic actions of sub-national governments within an existing state (McMillan, 2017). However, the actors of counter-diplomacy lack the means, mandate and resources to act and they are against the established powers through continuous state interference. Similarly, transnational protest is against the unitary state and introduces non-state claims into global politics (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2014).
According to Fiona McConnell, the phenomenon of relations of minorities, indigenous people, and stateless communities can be analysed only from the perspective of performance (McConnell, 2018). Since the conditions of participation in diplomatic affairs are highly unequally distributed among different actors, their real participation becomes an issue, hence the problem of legitimacy has to be considered (McConnell, 2018). There is a political aspect of diplomatic decorum that allows one to distinguish diplomats from legitimate actors (McConnell, 2018). The practical use of street theatre in the process of representation is that it allows local performances to be converted to diplomatic documentation via media technologies (such as cameras) (Drury, 2025; McConnell, 2018). Thus, details of local protests become known to the international community (Drury, 2025).
This fact is especially evident when diplomacy is aestheticised (McConnell, 2018). Aesthetics in this case should be understood in terms of synchronised meaning-making including ritual, gesture, body presence, space arrangement, and theatre that uses the aforementioned theatrical techniques to subvert the conventions of politics in the process of authority production (McConnell, 2018). To put it differently, as noted by Quijano, the coloniality of power refers to the fact that the colonial categorisation allows the attribution of authoritative status to some claims, leaving others without the same(Quijano, 2000). Colonial mapping creates differential political visibility through the determination of the starting and end points of sovereignty, thus subordinating non-European governmental systems to the hierarchy of political sufficiency (Quijano, 2000).
Decolonial approaches explore the process by which a marginalised group can somehow transform the space they occupy simply by being there (Nicholson, 2014; Quijano, 2000). Performance does not mean collapsing the boundaries of the nation-state. On the contrary, performance calls into question the relevance of those borders; it turns borders into sites of collective memory (Nicholson, 2014). While they do not imply statehood as per international law, performances articulate it as a possibility through the collective “we”, land ties and affiliation, symbols, grievances, plans, and chances for a sovereign state (Varghese, 2020; Visoka, 2019). Performative citizenship and statehood-as-status signify that society emerges through ritual, identity claims, and imagery (Butler, 1990). Recognition is ongoing; it is never a final certificate of existence (McConnell, 2018; Visoka, 2019).
Boalian theatre is a political practice rather than therapy (Boal, 1979, 1999). In Image Theatre, a dialogue is built against the established narrative based on aesthetics and reality, whereas forum, invisible, and legislative theatre allow the dissolution of borders between actors and spectators (Boal, 1979, 1999). For people living in the occupied territories or without a state, the role of spectators turns into that of actors; thus, this shift provides the opportunity to use theatre to free oneself from oppression and tell one’s own story. Boal’s theatre is counter-diplomacy, since diplomacy is a collective discourse (Boal, 1979, 1999).
On one hand, foreign aid and financing of conflict resolution can be considered a support for Palestinian cultural organisations , and at the same time, it changes the discourse so dramatically that the result will be what can be called “phantom sovereignty”, where the resistance is there but the struggle against colonisation weakens (Nicholson, 2021). Therefore, the counter-diplomacy process can be disturbed as self-determination becomes the issue. It is the paradox of the Palestinian Theatre where reality created by colonisation, censorship, and political violence influences the process of creation, whereas the theatre produces the identity of Palestinians (Nicholson, 2021; Varghese, 2020).
This role is increased by Palestine’s international status as a UN non-member observer State after resolution ES-10/23 in 2024 expanded participation rights. (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2012, 2024). In this way, a diplomatic agency can be defined as an intermediary since Palestine is not a state actor while still being more powerful than a non-member state (McConnell, 2018; Visoka, 2019). It is worth noting that de jure and de facto status allows for the development of performative practices (Visoka, 2019). As per the International Committee of the Red Cross, West bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip are considered occupied Palestinian territory (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC], 2024) with the humanitarian situation of the people worsening in 2025 (United Nations in Palestine, 2025).
The International Court of Justice on July 19, 2024, delivered its advisory opinion in which Israel’s actions and presence in the Occupied Territory were described as illegal (International Court of Justice [ICJ], 2024). Moreover, it highlighted the Israeli government’s violation of the Palestinians’ right of self-determination and stressed the importance of compliance with international law in the future (ICJ, 2024). However, the existence of the right does not necessarily mean that the opportunities to exercise that right exist.
The UN General Assembly on September 12, 2025, approved the New York Declaration through voting (United Nations, 2025). The document was supported by 142 countries and rejected by only 10 states (United Nations, 2025). Later, on September 21-22, Australia, Andorra, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Portugal, and the United Kingdom (UK) recognised Palestine (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2025; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2025; France Diplomatie, 2026; Government of Canada, 2025). This is evidence of the advantages and drawbacks of statehood in terms of visibility, which allows for recognition but not always effective control over territory.
The Sahrawi population was unsuccessful in their quest for independent status in Western Sahara (United Nations, n.d.; United Nations Security Council, 2025). In this situation, civil protests allow for Sahrawis to take charge and play the role of actors in the fight for recognition in the international arena instead of remaining mere spectators (Drury, 2025). In addition to street protests, the method of “sousveillance” is being employed, wherein the body becomes the image that provides proof of action and helps establish diplomatic relations (Drury, 2025). Artists of Western Sahara also resort to satire as a means of explaining the problems of the exploitation of natural resources (Boulay, 2025). According to the World Food Programme (WFP), during July 2025, more than 133,000 impoverished people among the Sahrawi community were given help in Tindouf, though the funding was fairly insufficient and aid was heavily relied upon (World Food Programme, 2025). On the other hand, according to UN reports, the forecasts for the number of refugees during 2026-2027 were 173,600 people which would require financing of US$177 million (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2026). However, the core issue is that the Sahrawis have been playing a significant role as a humanitarian group, but have been politically incompetent in overcoming the obstacles of sovereignty. It is of utmost necessity to realise all initiatives to avoid keeping people in refugee status and preserve their identity and their right to self-determination.
The mobilisation of the Baloch is a fresh instance of this phenomenon, but without the usual sense of statelessness (Eggert et al., 2025). Despite being recognised as members of an internationally recognised state, Baloch's nationalism challenges the allocation of political power, resources and recognition. In this scenario, there is a lack of political recognition rather than the equivalent legal status as in the cases of Palestine and Western Sahara. Reports on the activism of Baloch women indicate their emergence as political activists who have sought or organised international aid (Eggert et al., 2025), while Human Rights Watch for 2026 has reported several arrests of activists and disruption to telecommunications during protests in Pakistan (Human Rights Watch, 2026). In March of 2025, UN human rights experts called for the release of detained Baloch activists and to end the campaign against peaceful protesters who had either been arrested, had disappeared or had been subjected to police violence by the Balochi Yakjehti Committee (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2025). This shows that the public sphere becomes the medium of political communication as standard political methods are becoming increasingly obsolete.
As a result, the issue is one not of legality but of politics. Political communication can be characterised by four elements: (1) visibility - the political communication has a political message; (2) representation - the action takes place and creates a political community; (3) transnationality - the performance is captured in films and videos that are seen globally; (4) recognition - the audience that witnesses the action has to see the actors as puppeteers, not objects of politics. The concept of recognition has to be understood as pressure through normative processes (McConnell, 2018). In essence, cultural death means that the environment in which identity is formed is destroyed. Moreover, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) claims that 164 objects of culture were damaged as of March 24, 2026. (UNESCO, 2026). United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported that, as of December 30, 2025, 955 incidents occurred in the territories under the organisation’s jurisdiction. (UNRWA, 2026). Although these facts do not say that the theatre is engaged in politics, they definitely illustrate the great importance of preservation of cultural identity for political action. In other words, recognition is incremental and relational; social, political, and legal recognitions may coincide, but they are not necessarily the same (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2021).
On the face of it, the idea of counter-diplomacy looks paradoxical and contradictory (McConnell, 2018). First, it rejects diplomacy for its neutrality and gains its power through the same neutrality (McConnell, 2018). An snti-state form of diplomacy, counter-diplomacy, faces many obstacles in achieving its objectives due to intervention by the states and other stakeholders, such as judges, media, international organisations and so on (McConnell, 2018). Despite the liberating nature of counter-diplomacy, it is still limiting as it imposes labels on people, such as nation, state, victim, human rights defender, refugee, representative and so on, which are created by the same order they reject and seek to change (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2021). Sovereignty of the state may be compared to the recognition which can be denounced deliberately (Visoka, 2019). Therefore, this concept appears to be very fragile as compared to legal language. It means that the recognition is not the aim in itself, but the claim to exist which should be proven to different audiences (Visoka, 2019). Moreover, international relations complicates this situation, as every meeting has its own format and rules which do not allow members to perform particular actions (McConnell, 2018). Street art can undermine the power of the institution, but when the meaning is interpreted in the cultural context, it loses its power, as the meaning transforms from “protest” to “human rights issue”, “performance” to “cultural activism”, and “territorial appeal” to “input from a stakeholder” (McConnell, 2018; Visoka & Brajshori, 2025).

The process of re-domestication is more than mere theory. The resources of international development of culture are the means of integrating radical political practices of Palestinians under the slogans of development or empowerment, thus making theatre appear as the agency of resistance when institutional process makes it alienated from its anti-colonial essence (Nicholson, 2021). It is important to introduce a counter-diplomatic practice that will be able to cope with the dilemma of legibility, both internationally and domestically, while being subjected to re-domestication at the same time. There is a similar problem in Western Sahara. While international organisations can easily accept the topic as a matter for their agenda, they have less political alternatives for it. UN Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025, extended the mandate of MINURSO up to 31 October 2026, and dealt with the Moroccan Proposal of Autonomy, accepting the idea of the solution without neglecting the idea of “final solution” about Sahrawi self-determination and autonomy (United Nations Security Council, 2025). This means that one may continue claiming sovereignty while lessening the scope of political negotiations.
It is essential not to glorify performance. Performance cannot replace institutional competence, legitimacy, and strength (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2021). It can prompt attentiveness without policy change; it can render things visible without making them identifiable; and it can invoke identification without imposing any obligation (McConnell, 2018). A performing person can be seen, detained, and subjected to repression (Drury, 2025). Moreover, performance can clearly make a person identifiable, and its dissemination through the internet may attract many more spectators (Drury, 2025).
The topic being addressed is undeniably related to political science because it concerns the following problem: who takes on the role of acting politically, under which conditions certain claims are accepted and how legitimacy and authority are obtained in international affairs. In the traditional interpretations of the problems of international relations, emphasis is laid on state actors, international organisations and diplomats. At the same time, street theatre highlights the importance of the political act that is performed by the people as communities do not have such opportunities to act through regular institutions. Therefore, the topic of street theatre extends the issue of international relations because it refers to non-state actors, public spheres, collective identities, media practices and international activism.
The constructivist approach to international relations allows seeing street performances as a means of creating collective identities and making claims for attribution of recognition; however, this approach does not suggest that street performers get sovereignty or that governments have to change their political agenda. The cases of Palestine, Western Sahara and Balochistan demonstrate that political science should differentiate between the legal status of the territories and their achievements in terms of power, representation and international recognition. The discussion of street performances through the lens of international law connects cultural activity with the important political issues of power, legitimacy and self-determination. For International Relations, its implication is mostly theoretical. Whereas the state is viewed as an institution of diplomacy, the street is regarded as an institution of protest (McConnell, 2018). On the contrary, if diplomacy is understood in its broad sense of representation, signalling, audience management, and political recognition, no such divide exists at all (McConnell, 2018). In this sense, street performance illustrates how people perform the diplomatic function without any specific training that entails organising the performance with missing individual participation, parodic annexation of space, re-contextualised occupation, and communicating the international message via bodily presence only (Boal, 1979; McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2014; Varghese, 2020).
In conclusion, the main site of diplomacy is the street itself. Where there is no official site, the people take up the matter in the street, turning streets into parliaments, a shout into a manifesto, a man into a flag, and performance into demanding permission for their existence. The performance in the street does not just ask people to listen; rather, it creates such a powerful environment that one simply cannot afford to overlook it (McConnell, 2018; Nicholson, 2014). Be it Palestine, Western Sahara, or Balochistan, the politics of each of them may be different, but what they have in common is the desire to prove their existence, tell their story through memory, and legitimise their visibility (Drury, 2025; Nicholson, 2014; Varghese, 2020). Possibly, this is the latent power of the performance which does not need an invitation to the site of diplomacy; instead, it takes to the streets, occupies the space, and demands from the world, “How long will you pretend that we don’t exist, despite us existing through thick and thin?”
By Sampurna Samanta Sampurna Samanta is an undergraduate student, pursuing Political Science Honours at Jadavpur University, Kolkata. An aspiring political scientist and a public policy and international affairs analyst with extensive experience in research, governance, diplomacy and strategic communication, she has been a key participant in several national and international conferences and youth summits including those organised by Harvard, Yale, the UNWOMEN, the World Bank and others. Being passionate about policy analysis, academic research and legislative affairs, Sampurna hopes to contribute meaningfully to every academic and policy conversation she participates in.
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