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Who Holds the Reins? Taming Misinformation in India’s Digital Governance

3 hours ago
8 min read


IMAGE CREDITS- PINTEREST
IMAGE CREDITS- PINTEREST

Introduction

There has been a ramp-up in the spread of misinformation through digital technologies, giving birth to various persistent problems. This has been corrosive to democratic institutions worldwide, eroding trust and legitimacy while simultaneously imperilling the social fabric of communities. This challenge to democratic institutions has intensified with the advent of artificial intelligence, skyrocketing both the span and sophistication of misinformation. In India, the Press Information Bureau's fact check unit has flagged over 37,000 pieces of misinformation and during the 18th Lok Sabha elections, WhatsApp received hundreds of complaints about deepfakes. Yet only 17 of India’s 120+ languages are bolstered by active fact-checking mechanisms, leaving a gigantic portion of the population exposed, especially in rural areas where wide digital literacy gaps loom. This ever-growing threat raises the fundamental question of who holds command over India’s digital governance and how regulatory, institutional and societal mechanisms can mitigate the menace of misinformation. At its core, the question of misinformation governance in India is a contest of authority: whether the reins of digital space are primarily held by the state, steered by powerful private platforms or shaped through citizen and civil society participation.


Who Actually Governs the Digital Public Sphere?

A rapid surge in the spread of misinformation is as much a social problem as a technological problem. To combat misinformation, all actors, including the platforms, media organisations, government and civil society, need to foster collaborative engagement with each other. But in this, citizen behaviour often sustains the misinformation ecosystem due to limited media literacy and sharing things without a credibility. The government, primarily through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), has asserted regulatory authority via the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, which obligate intermediaries to ensure traceability, compliance and timely takedowns, thereby expanding state power in digital governance (MeitY, 2021).

The Fact Check Unit under the PIB, established in 2019, seeks to deter the creation and circulation of fake news pertaining to the Government of India. It simultaneously provides citizens with an institutional mechanism to report dubious or misleading information, although its scope remains limited since it primarily addresses misinformation related to government policies rather than the wider digital ecosystem. Platforms such as Meta, Google, X and WhatsApp wield infrastructural power by developing algorithms and moderation policies that ensure the visibility and virality of content. Their commercial interests and claims to autonomy often place them at odds with governmental directives, underscoring tensions between platform autonomy and state control (Sundar, 2023).

Additionally, civil society actors such as AltNews, BOOM Live and the Internet Freedom Foundation serve as vital counterweights by conducting independent fact checks, uncovering organised misinformation networks and upholding digital rights. Their presence in this contemporary landscape introduces an element of accountability and pluralism into the governance architecture, often bridging the trust deficit between the state, platforms and citizens. Together, these actors shape the contested terrain of authority in India’s digital governance.


Regulatory Framework: Governing Misinformation in India

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and their subsequent amendments form the base for India's regulation against the surge of misinformation. The rules cast layered obligations upon intermediaries, in particular, Significant Social Media Intermediaries (SSMIs) like WhatsApp, X and Meta. They require due diligence features such as grievance redressal systems, monthly compliance reports and time-bound takedown of reported content. A key provision is the “first originator” requirement, compelling encrypted messaging platforms to enable traceability of viral content, a measure explicitly designed to address misinformation but one that has drawn concern over user privacy and encryption. The amendments of 2023 also further bolstered and institutionalised fact checking units, envisaging government-authorised bodies with the power to direct intermediaries to remove patently false content about the state. Although the framework strengthens platform accountability on paper, it has been disparaged for granting excessive control to the executive, relying on vague definitional standards, and providing inadequate procedural safeguards.

Sheer judicial scrutiny has reinforced these concerns. More than seventeen petitions challenging the IT Rules are pending before the Delhi High Court following transfer from several High Courts, with international platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook challenging traceability and takedown provisions. The Bombay High Court ultimately struck down the 2023 amendment to the Information Technology Rules which enabled the Union government to establish a Fact Check Unit for identifying information relating to the business of the Central Government as “fake, false or misleading". The constitutional validity of the provision was subsequently challenged before the Supreme Court. In March 2026, the Supreme Court issued notice in the Union government’s appeal and declined to stay the Bombay High Court’s judgement, directing that the matter be heard by a three-judge bench. The constitutional question therefore remains pending. These judicial actions bring into focus the constitutional conflict between addressing misinformation and upholding fundamental rights. A comparative approach further pins down this conflict. The European Union's Digital Services Act (DSA) is a better-modelled template by taking a risk-based approach, requiring systemic platforms to undertake autonomous audits, publish transparency reports and implement notice and action procedures under the oversight of an independent regulator. In contrast to India's executive-dominated framework, the DSA amalgamates procedural protections and institutional independence into its architecture. For India, the dilemma is how to move beyond control through compliance to a model of governance that establishes a balance between accountability and civic liberties, ensuring that the cure for misinformation does not undermine the very democratic institutions it seeks to protect. Still, the law alone does not capture the deeper political struggles shaping digital governance, which emerge most starkly in clashes between the state and platforms.


Power Struggles: Platforms, State and Democratic Trust

Habermas described the public sphere as a space where citizens form opinions through free and reasoned debate, independent from both state control and market pressure. In India’s digital setting, platforms like WhatsApp and Twitter resemble such a sphere, but they also show its weaknesses. They have opened new avenues for democratic participation, yet they are equally shaped by state demands and commercial interests, making them sites of constant contestation.

The traceability rule under the IT Rules, 2021 shows this tension clearly. Rule 4(2) asks platforms to disclose the “first originator” of a message, even on encrypted services. WhatsApp has opposed this, arguing that it breaks privacy protections laid down in Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017). The government, in contrast, claims it is needed to check fake news and protect public order. A similar clash occurred during the farmer protests of 2020–21, when X (formerly Twitter) resisted some takedown requests before finally giving in. These incidents reveal how questions of privacy, speech and authority play out in India’s digital governance.

The Brookings Institution notes that while encryption shields rights, unchecked misinformation in closed groups has the capacity to hurt democratic stability. It suggests middle paths such as stronger metadata checks, transparent political advertising and fact checking, instead of weakening encryption. The real challenge is to balance citizen freedoms with state security needs, without depleting democratic trust. If the state overreaches, people may see it as censorship; if platforms avoid responsibility, misinformation grows unchecked. In both cases, public faith in digital governance suffers, showing that the real question is not only about controlling misinformation but also about who commands authority in the digital sphere and whether that power serves democracy or weakens it.

IMAGE CREDITS-PINTEREST
IMAGE CREDITS-PINTEREST

Towards Equitable Governance: Policy Recommendations

India requires a system of governance that keeps a fair balance between the role of the government, the responsibilities of online platforms and the active participation of people in decision-making. One important step is the creation of an independent regulator with judicial oversight, as highlighted in the Vidhi Centre’s research report on platform regulation. Such an arrangement could reduce excessive executive control while creating greater institutional independence. The OECD Digital Government Framework also suggests that democratic digital systems achieve their matured stage when values like transparency, accountability and regular assessment practices are integrated into their design. India can adopt these measures by bolstering grievance redressal mechanisms, ensuring periodic audits of platforms and making compliance reports accessible to the public.

At the community level, providing people with media and information literacy is essential for resilience against misinformation. UNESCO offers tried and tested plans for national literacy programmes, while the Digital Empowerment Foundation demonstrates the potential of rural initiatives and women-led collectives to train communities in safe digital behaviour and local fact checking. Augmenting these efforts widely will help reduce disparities in language and access that make citizens more vulnerable to false information.Artificial intelligence can assist in detecting misinformation and deepfakes but human oversight should remain central. These combined measures will not only reduce the rapid spread of misinformation but will also help establish a more structured and strengthened democratic system.


Conclusion

In India’s evolving digital landscape, misinformation shapes how power is shared and how much faith citizens place in democracy. The UN’s ‘Our Common Agenda’ calls for digital cooperation that is grounded in openness and accountability. Carnegie Endowment cautions that regulation in India must guard liberties while promoting responsibility, while Castells emphasises the centrality of identity and trust in any digital society. The governance of misinformation is ultimately a question of distributed authority. The state possesses regulatory power; platforms exercise infrastructural and algorithmic power; courts impose constitutional limits; and citizens and civil society provide participatory and countervailing mechanisms. The challenge for Indian digital governance is therefore not to place the reins in the hands of a single actor, but to design institutional arrangements that prevent any one actor from becoming the unchecked arbiter of the digital public sphere.

REFERENCES  1.Press Information Bureau. (2024). PIB Fact Check Unit Notification.https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2015792

2.Times of India. (2024). WhatsApp's Tipline helps in tackling deepfakes in India during Lok Sabha elections 2024. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/technology/tech-news/whatsapps-tipline-helps-in-tackling-deepfakes-in-india-during-lok-sabha-elections-2024/articleshow/110596124.cms

3.Columbia SIPA. (2024). Practical Solutions for Addressing Digital Misinformation. https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/2024-06/United States Department of State, Global Engagement Center.pdf

4.Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2023). Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (as amended). https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/02/Information-Technology-Intermediary-Guidelines-and-Digital-Media-Ethics-Code-Rules-2021-updated-06.04.2023-.pdf

5.Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2023). Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (as amended). https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2024/02/Information-Technology-Intermediary-Guidelines-and-Digital-Media-Ethics-Code-Rules-2021-updated-06.04.2023-.pdf

8.European Union. (2022). Digital Services Act. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act

9.Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. MIT Press. 10.BBC. (2024). India farmers' protest: X admits to taking down posts and accounts. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68366859 

11.Brookings Institution. (2023). India's Digital Governance and Platform Accountability. https://www.brookings.edu

12. Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy. (2023). Report of Platform Economy Roundtable. https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Vidhi-Website_Report-of-Platform-Economy-Roundtable.pdf

13. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2020). The OECD Digital Government Policy Framework. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-oecd-digital-government-policy-framework_f64fed2a-en.html

14.UNESCO. (2024). Media and Information Literacy. https://www.unesco.org/en/media-information-literacy 15.Digital Empowerment Foundation. (2024). Safeguarding Rural India Through Critical Digital Literacy. https://www.defindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Aspen-Endline-Report_14-Oct-2024-2-1.pdf

16.Carnegie Endowment. (2024). Regulation or Repression? Government Influence on Social Media Moderation. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/india-thailand-social-media-moderation?lang=en

By Nitish Narang and Sakshi Yadav Nitish Narang is a third-year B.A. (Hons.) Political Science student at Atma Ram Sanatan Dharma College, University of Delhi. His academic interests lie at the intersection of public policy, governance, international relations and economics. He is passionate about policy research, analytical writing and public speaking, with a particular focus on translating theoretical insights into practical governance solutions. 


Sakshi Yadav is a graduate in political science (Hons.) from Atma Ram Sanatan Dharma College, University of Delhi, with a strong interest in governance, public policy, and institutional processes. She served as the Content Head at the Women Development Cell, where she contributed to content development and collaborative initiatives. Actively engaged in research and writing, she continues to strengthen her analytical and communication skills while expanding her understanding of politics and public policy.









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