Construction of Autonomy Within Hegemonic Constraints

The colonial subjugation faced by India has created a deep-seated imperative to protect sovereignty and end external domination in all forms including ideological (Chatterjee, 1993). Non-alignment was one such assertion where India chose to remain outside the framework of ideological bipolarity created in the 1960s in the form of Cold War (Ganguly, 2017). The recalibration of foreign policy instruments are a reflection of evolving power structures, making India’s quest for full political and economic independence operational (Mohan, 2003). Thus, the self-assertion of ‘strategic autonomy’ was adopted by India in spirit to remain independent in decision-making capacity amidst external pressures and polarisation in the world  (Pant, 2019).

In the realist ideology of international relations, anarchy refers to the absence of a single powerful authority to arbitrate disputes or enforce global law (Waltz, 1979). Instead, each nation state is compelled to act in its own self-interest because it would be the ultimate protector of its own security and ensuring survival (Mearsheimer, 2001). This conception provides a moral realist justification for India to practise strategic neutrality in pragmatic pursuit of self-interests (Tellis, 2020). Various historical factors, from colonial legacies to economic liberalisation (1991) and subsequent integration of India into the global market economy, have changed the relations of material dependency and strategic support (Ahluwalia, 2002) which created both leverage access to wide markets of world, issue-based collaboration—and vulnerabilities, including supply-chain exposure, and multi-faceted dependencies on defence equipments, technology and related capacities (Narlikar, 2010). This helped in reframing the definition of autonomy from non-alignment to a fluid framework of multialignment termed ‘strategic autonomy’ with free choice to establish epistemic linkages in the world (Saran, 2018).

Antonio Gramsci, the 20th century Italian Marxist philosopher, defined the concept of Cultural Hegemony as ‘the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production’ (Gramsci,1971).

Deriving from Gramsci’s ideas, Robert Cox conceptualised how theory is always for someone and for some purpose and therefore the international order emerges from historically specific social relations and production patterns (Cox, 1981).

Both Gramsci and Cox believe that hegemony is maintained not just by coercive power but also through the institutionalisation of consent. The domination of certain social forces at the international level is reinforced by international institutions, production linkages, and the spread of ideologies that normalise existing hierarchies. Cox takes Gramsci's concept to a global scale, suggesting that international institutions, far from being neutral, function as world order mechanisms, stabilising and reproducing the interests of dominant nations and social classes (Cox 1981). 

Strategic autonomy is therefore historically situated, being continuously shaped by modes of production and the historical balance of social forces. ‘Autonomy’ is a contingent project, shaping itself around current realities. India's experience illustrates this dynamic.  

Furthermore, when applied to the world of international relations, this hegemony reflects the dominant discourse of the West, particularly the USA, which shapes the hegemonic structure of global politics. This can be seen in the continued institutional dominance of Western powers in international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as the existence of  trade imbalances. The IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)  therefore act as vehicles for the transmission of hegemonic norms, promoting a liberal economic worldview that prioritises deregulation, privatisation and openness as ‘universal’ developmental measures. 

President Trump’s attempt to upheave the current trade regime has caused widespread repercussions on countries around the world, including India, and has reflected the coercive power which the USA still exercises. Recent attempts by the USA to regulate India’s oil imports from Russia further reflects this trajectory.   

The current geopolitical and economic order in which India is exercising its strategic autonomy is largely influenced by dominant powers (Acharya, 2014). The dominating powers rarely make universal norms or rules, but exercise their will using selective security architectures, standards of technology and setting a narrow definition of what constitutes a ‘powerful nation’ (Kupchan, 2010), which eventually impacts the choices made by developing countries including India on the global stage (Mukherjee, 2020).

The dominant powers frame the parameters of autonomy by designing structures that favour their economic or broader diplomatic assertions, helping them to remain in dominant positions by reproducing those coercive pressures under the guise of sovereign independence (Keohane, 1984). 

The most recent example of how, despite the Western sanctions, India continued importing Russian military hardware reflects a sharply deliberated space created within restrictions by these powerful nations (Raja Mohan, 2022). This interplay reveals that autonomy is a dialectic which  emerges from the recognition and orchestration of hegemonic constraints rather than actual freedom from them. 

Constructivist logic would argue for reconstitution of the concept of autonomy through social interactions, discourse and recognition, and this shows how the meaning of independent decision-making itself has shifted. India’s simultaneous partnerships with Iran and the United States, or Russia and Europe are examples of how new discourse shaped by language and mutual recognition establishes and changes its meaning, making autonomy relational rather than independent self-assertion of a nation-state (Chhibber, 2021).

For instance, Indian claim of ‘digital sovereignty’ while engaging in Western-led technological frameworks exemplifies how autonomy is shaped by an underlying performative discourse. India’s Unified Protocol Interface (UPI) system has become a globally admired digital public infrastructure program which facilitates more than 18.39 billion transactions in June 2025, averaging over 640 million daily transactions, making it the largest fast-payment system globally (Press Information Bureau, 2025; NPCI, 2025). It can rightly be stated as technological self-reliance. But the allowance of operations by global players like Google Pay and Amazon Pay  clearly proves the stance that autonomy is negotiated through selective integration, making it a process rather than a condition. 

India’s participation in diverse global groupings like QUAD, BRICS, and SCO not only illustrates that India has a freedom to exercise its choice to be a member of any group, but also underscores relational sovereignty under which autonomy becomes the ability of India to decide, influence and interpret one’s role within overlapping power networks.  

India must shift the narrative and transcend the dominant Western hegemonical structure. Our foreign policy must strengthen material self i.e. reliance and focus on the Global South as a powerful force in the world order. Another significant aspect here is to move towards epistemic decolonisation which involves freeing policy paradigms from Eurocentric frameworks. It is necessary to break the existing colonial nature of policy and move towards an indigenous re–alignment. Furthermore, we must seek to reduce structures of dependency and effectively strive for structural transformation to break the stranglehold of hegemony and push forth as truly autonomous actors. 

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WRITER CREDITS

Ritika Swami and Anvi Srivastava are 2nd year Students of Political science (hons) at Lady Shri Ram College for women.