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Geopolitics of the Caucasus

Out of the “eight plus” wars that President Donald Trump claims to have solved in his second term so far is the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the roots of which go deeper than the collapse of the USSR. The conflict centres around the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, but historically populated by ethnic Armenians. These two countries fell victim to Joseph Stalin’s ‘Sovietization’ in 1920 as two distinct SSRs, before unifying into a single republic by the name of Transcaucasian SFSR (Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) in 1922. Stalin’s surreptitious strategy of keeping each state swinging at each other to prevent a single-minded mutiny against the centre was what led to his special intervention to keep the Nagorno-Karabakh region within Soviet Azerbaijan, rather than Armenia, a decision rooted in his role as Commissar of Nationalities. 


An independence referendum in the Nagorno Karabakh with 99.98% of ethnic Armenians voting in favour of a sovereign state set the stage for the 1991 declaration of the Republic of Artsakh just as the Soviet Union was collapsing. This prompted a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that lasted till 1994, with Armenian troops advancing into a further nine percent of Azeri territory. 


Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan and a mutual defence treaty was signed between the two allies, which are often referred to as “one nation, two states”. During the first Armenia-Azerbaijan war, Ankara put its foot down by choosing to seal its border with Yerevan, thus ceasing all overland access for cross-border trade or otherwise. The thaw in their relationship has a historical allusion to the 1915 genocide, wherein one million Armenians were killed by Ottoman Turks, an event that Ankara has refused to acknowledge till date. \


Western companies spearheaded by London-based BP (Beyond Petroleum, previously British Petroleum) decided to build pipelines across the Caucasus immediately after the collapse of USSR, and such was the extent of Azerbaijan’s petrostate wealth that from 2000-2014, Azerbaijan held the title of the fastest growing economy in the world owing to its vast hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea. 


The $45bn Southern Gas Corridor, completed in 2020, is one such project spanning through the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Comprising the South Caucasus, the Trans Anatolian and the Trans Atriatic Pipelines, it is capable of meeting two percent of the EU’s entire natural gas demand. This partly explains Ankara’s unwavering commitment to Baku since the former is keen to position itself as a key transit point in EU’s efforts to diversify away from Russian natural gas, which further amplify economic pressures since in 2022, the EU signed a deal with Azerbaijan to double their annual gas supplies (in billion cubic meters) by 2027. The BTC pipeline connecting Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan is another project that exemplifies this trilateral in the Caucasus region. 


The paradoxical nature of these tortuous dynamics can be seen in how Azerbaijan views its southern neighbour Iran as a regional threat, in spite of both of them being Shia-majority states, and allies instead with Turkey, a Sunni-majority state, to achieve its geopolitical goals. This is partly due to the demographic threat posed by the presence of 15 million Azeris in Iran, which is even more than the Azeri population itself. Notwithstanding the potential secessionist implications, the situation is further complicated by Israel’s positioning as a key conduit in the Azeri alliance, which it views as a strategic opportunity to counterbalance Iran. Israel is the second largest defence partner of Azerbaijan (after Turkey), which is responsible for forty percent of the former’s crude oil supply. Moreover, Israel is alleged to have access to several Azerbaijani bases that could enable strikes deep into Iranian territory, a possibility that reportedly materialised during the kinetic exchanges between Israel and Iran in June 2025 . Consequently, Iran has sought to consolidate economic and security relations with Armenia, with particular emphasis on the currently closed Zangezur Corridor as a strategic buffer and connectivity route.


In 2020, Azerbaijan launched an offensive into Armenia while it’s security patron Russia was distracted in its own Ukrainian gamble, and succeeding in reversing the territorial frontlines in its own favour. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, a security alliance including Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, failed to invoke its collective defence clause on the flimsy argument that since the Armenian proper wasn’t under direct attack, the mutual defence clause did not apply. Russia’s passive contribution came in the shape of awkward attempts at mediating negotiations, culminating in the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces at the Lachin Corridor connecting the Nagorno Karabakh province to Armenian territory. 


 In August 2025, a US-brokered peace agreement established a transit corridor connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave running through Armenia’s border with Turkey. Named after the President of the USA, the land for the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ has exclusive development rights of the USA since it has been leased from Armenia for 49 years. 


The region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, therefore, lies at the intersection of power politics and energy routes, where security alliances and pipeline networks reinforce each other. The Russia–Armenia partnership seeks strategic insulation, while the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Israel axis uses energy corridors to project influence. Together, these rival blocs ensure that the region remains a volatile geopolitical crossroad rather than a stable periphery.

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WRITER CREDITS

Aahna Yadav is a second year student of political science..


 
 
 

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