Strategic Ambiguity As a Diplomatic Tool : Understanding Chinese Strategic Culture

“Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.” — Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The Ruse of the Empty City

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This is a story from the infamous Chinese classic, “Romance of the Three Kingdom”. In the story, the general Zhuge Liang of Shu kingdom, was in danger of being besieged by the rival Wei kingdom in his fortress at Xicheng. His own forces were very far away to stop this invasion. Zhuge Liang, in order to counter this situation, ordered all the city gates to be open. All the soldiers were asked to dress as common people doing their daily life chores. Zhuge Liang himself sat at the top of the fortress gate playing the Chinese string instrument “Qin”. The Wei general witnessing this strange spectacle got tricked that if he invades this fortress he will get into a problem, as it seems to be totally protected. The story is an example of how psychological anxiety could help win conflicts and how ambiguity is a great tool of diplomacy, one that China loves to use in its foreign policy.

Deception and Use of Force

Deception as an instrument of statecraft is common to several cultures. One can find echoes of it in Nitisara and Arthashastra. The Mughals used it, the British excelled in it. But in China, deception is much more significant than in other cultures. Same is the case with use of force to achieve national interests. In most cultures force is seen as the last means when all other means have failed. But Chinese strategic culture sees force as a “Trump card” that they may use whenever suitable. One must not forget the fact on what principle the nation got into existence — royal rumble among Communist and Kuomintang forces. Now contrast it to a quite non-violent movement that played a role in India’s independence and the role of the same movement in establishing the modern Indian state and its ideals.

When Nehru visited Beijing in 1956, he had a conversation with Chairman Mao on the nature of war, where Mao explained how war is not that evil, as revolutions are necessary for people’s emancipation. He suggested that the Second World War is the reason India and China are now independent nations. Nehru on the other side highlighted the issues posed by nuclear weapons. This is when Mao made the chilling statement — “even if nuclear weapons were used China and India would still have hundred million people left”.

The Tools at Work

During the early 50’s, Nehru highlighted the matter of Chinese maps showing a large chunk of Indian land as their territory, of which Zhou Enlai explained that they were old Kuomintang maps which hadn’t been reviewed and revised. One must notice how he didn’t accept that they were wrong or that Indian maps are right. Another incident is when some months before the 1962 war Nehru met Zhou in Beijing to express his concern over how China is now starting to mirror the Pakistani view on Kashmir as a disputed territory. Nehru highlighted the fact that previously when asked — did they recognise Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir? Zhou said, “Has China ever said that it doesn’t?” Zhou now repeated the same statement without “not” — “Has China ever said that it does?” This is how subtly China uses deception and strategic ambiguity as diplomatic tools.

The Case of the Indo-China Border

Before 1958, China did not dispute the Mc Mohan line on the eastern sector in any operational sense. Nehru in his letter to U Nu, Myanmar’s leader, affirmed that Zhou only had a problem with the colonial name of it. Though the fact is how subtly Zhou portrayed his dissatisfaction while not clarifying his intentions on western sector. Even Nehru didn’t formally clear the status of western borders while China built a road there and India hardened the territory on maps. This allowed China to consolidate control quietly while avoiding confrontation until it was strategically ready.

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In 1958, the Indian government presented a memorandum to the Chinese side formally protesting on Xinjiang-Tibet highway. This changed everything. According to Chinese scholar Wang Hongwei, China now saw future talks as a “hard bargain”. So it chose to use the previously undisputed eastern sector as a counterweight by raising large claims over it. This was done to secure its interests in the western sector. This is substantiated by the 1962 war where China advanced well beyond claimed lines on the eastern sector, then unilaterally withdrew to the Mc Mohan alignment, while in the west it retained Aksai Chin plus some more newly acquired key areas. This pattern only makes sense if China always accepted the Mc Mohan line in principle.

Zhou Enlai’s Package proposal also reinforced this, as under the package China will accept the Mc Mohan line in the east and India would accept Chinese claims in western sector. Even Deng Xiaoping reiterated the proposal. This was only the case till 1985, as China realised that the power asymmetry is great between both nations, it sought to relive its Middle Kingdom pride of ancient times. It no longer sees the eastern sector as a counterweight but as weight itself. All previous acceptance and proposals are just labelled by China as us misunderstanding their leaders’ statement, which is quite real as the statements themselves were made in a way that they leave some ambiguities to play around behind.

Conclusion

The Chinese strategic culture resembles water - without a fixed shape, adapting itself to the changing containers of time. To deal with China effectively, India must be deeply familiar with this strategic tool of ambiguity. Every Chinese statement must be examined not only for what it says, but for what it deliberately leaves unsaid. Apparent reassurance should never be mistaken for clarity. As the Empty City Ruse reminds us, even a war general calmly playing the Qin may have no reinforcements at all.  

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Shyam Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series

Volumes covering 1957–1959

Official letters, speeches, and correspondence with Asian leaders

Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India

White Papers on India–China relations (1959, 1962)

Parliamentary debates on the border issue

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WRITER CREDITS

Chirag is a second-year Political Science student at the Hindu college of University of Delhi and an aspiring diplomat. He is passionate about learning about different countries, their histories, and global affairs, because he believes understanding diverse perspectives helps us better understand the world as a whole.